Behind Closed Doors

The birth of psychoanalysis owes much to Sigmund Freud’s encounter with anti-Semitism. There is little doubt it led to Freud’s failing to obtain a much hoped for academic appointment in Vienna and for a number of years he was forced to work without public recognition and in isolation. Later he was to write:

Nor is it perhaps entirely a matter of chance that the first advocate of psychoanalysis was a Jew. To profess belief in this new theory called for a certain degree of readiness to accept a situation of solitary opposition - a situation with which no one is more familiar than a Jew. (Freud, 1925: 222)

Freud’s counteroffensive was to harness his astonishing intellectual powers to formulate in an entirely new way the communications of patients themselves in flight from the diktat of the unconscious. This he did by listening to what his patients had to tell him about themselves and their lives instead of telling them what he thought was wrong with them. The revolution he inspired was to break with the neuropathology of Jean Martin Charcot and to challenge the ‘medicalization’ of neurosis.

Even so, Freud saw himself as working within the greater and impersonal scientific tradition established by René Descartes, objectifying the field of study, believing himself, the observing instrument, to be impartial and thereby analysing the psyche into its constituent parts. In the white heat of his research into the nature of the unconscious, Freud did not, as far as we know, particularly reflect on the real, extra-transferential relationships he formed with his patients in the course of a twelve-hour analytic day. Nor, when psychoanalysis as a movement brought Freud the comfort of friendship with like-minded colleagues, the better able to challenge a still largely hostile medical profession, did he swerve from his austere scrutiny of the individual psyche as a thing in itself.

This task, as Bakan (1958) has pointed out, was perfectly suited to Freud’s identification with the Jewish mystical tradition. Bakan writes:

The Kabbalistic tradition has it that the secret teachings are to be transmitted orally to one person at a time, and even then only to selected minds and by hints. This is indeed what Freud was doing in the actual practice of psychoanalysis, and this aspect of the Kabbalistic tradition is still maintained in the education of the modern psychoanalyst. He must receive the tradition orally (in the training analysis). (Bakan, 1958: 35)

Thirty years on we could be forgiven for thinking this still holds true; psychoanalysis, the church, its congregation outside the door to be admitted, but only one at a time.
The Contribution of Psychoanalysis

On the other hand, it appears that where a powerful impetus has been given to group formation neuroses may diminish and, at all events temporarily, disappear. (Freud, 1921: 142)

The therapeutic potential of the group had not escaped Freud’s attention. Yet Freud saw no need for a theory of group process that might one day enlarge on, or even supersede, the psychoanalytic viewpoint. In his study of groups, and specifically concerning the leader-centred group, he wrote:

A primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego. (Freud, 1921: 116)

The source of this ego ideal was believed by Freud to lie in the fate of the primal father of the horde.

If he died, he had to be replaced; his place was probably taken by a youngest son, who had up to then been a member of the group like any other. There must therefore be a possibility of transforming group psychology into individual psychology. (Freud, 1921: 124, my emphasis)

When neither leader nor substitutive ego ideal was to be found, Freud pessimistically remarked:

There forces itself on our notice the danger of a state of things that might be termed ‘the psychological poverty of groups’. This danger is most threatening where the bonds of a society are chiefly constituted by the identification of its members with one another, while individuals of the leader type do not acquire the importance that should fall to them in the formation of a group. (Freud, 1929: 115)

With the advantage of hindsight, we can appreciate how much Freud’s outlook on groups was shaped by his own experience of life, not least the dynamics of his professional circle (Roazen, 1975). Unfortunately, Freud’s scepticism probably accounts for the lack of enthusiasm many psychoanalysts show to this day for analytic group therapy. As it turned out, the theoretical development which followed and which stimulated psychoanalysts to extend their theory in relational terms was the advent of object relations psychology. Under the commanding eye of Melanie Klein, research over two decades showed the human infant to be not only instinctually driven but also primarily object seeking. Klein (1952: 433) writes:

My use of the term ‘object-relations’ is based on my contention that the infant has from the beginning of post-natal life a relation to the mother (although focusing primarily on her breast), which is imbued with the fundamental elements of an object-relation, i.e. love, hatred, phantasies, anxieties, and defences.

The internalisation of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ breast, with the subsequent integration of these primitive idealizations, was taken to form the prototype of all relationships that follow. On this primary attachment to mother the baby depended for its mental as well as physical survival. Winnicott (1952: 99) was moved to exclaim: ‘There is no such thing as a baby . . . only a nursing couple.’
This deceptively simple remark indicates a fundamental revision of theory; the number two now comes before one and one must always contain at least two.

Yet this group of two remains descriptively confined by a language that sounds more dead than alive, with the use of such terms as splitting, projection and projective identification, and not least, the word ‘object’! The language of nineteenth-century science threatens to turn the nursing couple into a thing, just as surely as did Freud’s account of the ‘psychic apparatus’. We only tolerate this state of affairs because we know it is well intentioned and because the body of theory in question is a child of its time, a post-Renaissance foundling rapt in the pursuit of individuality!

In clinical practice, the nursing couple is, of course, reconstituted by analyst and patient. The breast feed is offered by means of ‘holding’ and ‘containing’ and internal object relations are re-worked not only through the analysis of the transference but also by means of the actual presence of the analyst/mother. The use of the couch reinforces this emphasis placed on the first year of life. Indeed, the aim of treatment is no less than a psychological rebirth. But the third party, who prefigures all that is not mother (and represented most often by father), can join in only when summoned, being, like a ghost, without material substance and known only through the medium of the transference.

Metapsychology aims to provide for this development by what is sometimes called ‘triangulation’, a figure of speech curiously borrowed from trigonometry. But trying to use the language of object-relations theory when three or more are gathered together presents a task of formidable complexity, which may explain why theorists of family process favour systemic-based concepts.

The Foulkesian Approach

S.H. Foulkes was always interested in what the wider world had to offer, and he tackled it with enthusiasm. After qualifying as a doctor, he joined Kurt Goldstein’s department in the Frankfurt Institute of Neurology for two years, and later, when he was director of the Psychoanalytical Clinic there, became involved in the activities of the adjacent Sociological Institute (Pines, 1978). In 1933 Foulkes came to England as a refugee from Nazi Germany. He worked at first as a psychoanalyst, like his compatriot Klein, who had arrived seven years previously. But seeds had been sown which were to bear fruit a few years later when Foulkes began to ask himself what would happen if his patients, whom he knew individually so well, were to start meeting together. The decisive step he took was informed by a deeply held conviction, which he summarized as follows:

Each individual - itself an artificial, though plausible, abstraction - is centrally and basically determined, inevitably, by the world in which he lives, by the community, the group, of which he forms a part. (Foulkes, 1948: 10).

In bringing together the analytic group, Foulkes found himself irretrievably estranged from many of his psychoanalytic colleagues. Perhaps the problem was that within the frame of reference of psychoanalysis, Foulkes'
actions could only be conceptualised as acting out in the countertransference. But Foulkes could not turn back. He went on to state:

. . . the old juxtaposition of an inside and outside world, constitution and environment, individual and society, phantasy and reality, body and mind and so on, are untenable. They can at no stage be separated from each other, except by artificial isolation. (Foulkes, 1948: 10, my emphasis)

Foulkes writes descriptively but keeping theory to a minimum, perhaps with good reason, for it is hard to do justice to the concept of ‘the group’ without using language which, because of the reductive nature of metapsychology, at once splits the group into its parts. Yet the notion of ‘the matrix’, which embodies the principle of connectedness within the group, so fascinated Foulkes that he was most anxious to find a formulation that could do it justice.

Foulkes chose the word ‘matrix’ deliberately because of the derivation of the word from ‘mother’ (Foulkes, 1975a). This gives the matrix a human frame of reference, a metaphor of nurture and growth that reflects the practice both of group analysis and its forebear, psychoanalysis. However, we have reason to believe Foulkes was reaching for a concept that transcends depth psychology. To take this further, we need to step outside the frame of group analysis, just as Foulkes in his time had to step outside the frame of psychoanalysis.

The Need for a New Kind of Formulation

Let us picture the ego as a network of cathected neurones well facilitated in relation to one another . . . (Freud, 1895: 323)

The social matrix can be thought of as a network in quite the same way as the brain is a network of fibres and cells, which together form a complex unit. (Foulkes and Anthony, 1957: 258)

We can begin by summarizing Foulkes’ statements on the matrix. Foulkes held the view that the members of a group are connected by a network of mental processes which both join the members and pass through them, and which emerge in the analytic group to comprise the ‘group mind’. Foulkes saw this product of the interaction of the individuals in the group not as a static structure but as a flowing, dynamic pulse, analogous to the relationship of mind to matter in the individual psyche. He writes:

The matrix is the hypothetical web of communication and relationship in a given group. It is the common shared ground, which ultimately determines the meaning and significance of all events and upon which all communication and interpretations, verbal and nonverbal rest. (Foulkes, 1964: 292)

And elsewhere:

Its lines of force may be conceived of as passing right through the individual members and may therefore be called a transpersonal network, comparable to a magnetic field. (Foulkes and Anthony, 1957: 258).

Foulkes is reaching after ‘the whole’ and not the parts, which is why the ideas of Kurt Goldstein attract him so powerfully. In his first book he writes:
The healthy organism functions as a whole and can be described as a system in a dynamic equilibrium. It has constantly to adjust. There is always a creative element present. It acts as if it knew its aim and had a choice as to the means to achieve this aim. To take into account all these factors we speak of the 'total situation'. (Foulkes, 1948: 1, my emphasis)

Intuitively, Foulkes went on to take the short step from the gestalt of the whole organism to the gestalt of the group-as-a-whole and now found himself possessed by a vision of the group that could no longer be reconciled with psychoanalysis. His insight may, like Friedrich August Kekule's vision of the benzene ring, have been born of reverie, in turn begotten of Foulkes' own psychoanalytic training; but the content of the vision was one not of reduction but of synthesis.

The problem shows up like a geological fault in Foulkes' account of the four levels of group process. The first level, of social reality; can be set aside because this does not require a theory of psychic structure. Levels two and three refer to the psychoanalytic constructs of whole and part-objects respectively.

Then we come to level four, the 'deepest' level, of which Foulkes (1964: 114) writes:

This . . . is the one in which primordial images appear, according to Freud's concepts and those particularly formulated by Jung concerning the collective unconscious.

The reference to Freud may have been wishful thinking because nowhere in the Standard Edition, at least, does Freud discuss primordial imagery. In contrast, the work of Carl Jung abounds with such images; they are no less than a royal road to the archetypes of the collective unconscious.

A Metaphor in Search of a Theory

The group is not the result of the interactions of individuals. (Foulkes, 1964: 109)

Taking that short step which carried Foulkes from the domain of the physiology of Goldstein to the realm of the group matrix comes readily enough to us now. We have learned through training and clinical experience to see and sense the group as a living organism. But while our feet are planted firmly on the new ground, our heads, which we require at least for theory making, remain in the clouds. How might the science of psychology provide us with a new set of constructs, specially tailored to the group but which honours the creativity and dynamism of the 'total situation'? What is the 'total situation' intended to be? Should it be the membership of the small group, the clinic that houses it, the community that spawns the clinic or the culture that underpins the community? How indeed can the ‘total situation’ have any boundaries within which a structure can be defined?

It makes sense first to see whether an existing psychological theory can be 'stretched' to accommodate the matrix and all that it implies. We have no evidence that Foulkes saw a way forward. Foulkes himself may have sensed
that he lacked the tools, for even his discussion on the four levels of group process, to which we have referred, was never to be repeated.

Freud’s theories are singularly inadaptable on a number of counts. Firstly, they are expressed in metaphors that are too mechanistic and ‘faded’ (Wright, 1976) to be applied to concepts that call for spontaneity, creativity and wholeness. Secondly, we are dealing with a psychology which puts a ‘skin’ around the individual psyche so that emotions such as humility and awe, which transcend our immediate, personal lives, find no mention anywhere in Freud’s work. Thirdly, Freud’s metapsychology makes for great difficulties when conceptualising a matrix, which, as Foulkes has indicated, concerns system, as much as structure. (The attempt made by some analysts (Hume, 1966; Rycroft, 1966) to effect a shift away from psychic determinism towards a theory of meaning and communication has been largely resisted by the psychoanalytic fraternity.) Lastly, there is no place in psychoanalytic theory for the ‘Foundation matrix ... based on the biological properties of the species, but also on the culturally firmly embedded values and reactions’ (Foulkes, 1975b: 131), which calls for a psychobiology of the species rather than the psychopathology of the consulting room.

**Jung’s Contribution**

...for analysis is always followed by synthesis, and what was divided on a lower level will reappear, united, on a higher one. (Jung, 1942: 189)

Let us put psychoanalysis on one side for the moment and continue what Foulkes began with his reference to the fourth or primordial level of group process, for if the whole can be taken to be more than the sum of its parts, we should be better able to describe the parts from the vantage point of the whole rather than vice versa. This is, after all, what informs our daily work as group analysts.

There is in Jung’s writing a deep concern with wholeness, expressed above all in his concept of the self. Jung takes the self to mean the totality of the psyche. This he defines as:

... consciousness first of all, then the personal unconscious, and finally an indefinitely large segment of the collective unconscious whose archetypes are common to all mankind. (Jung, 1950: 357)

Jung’s view of the relationship of ego to self is outlined in the following passage:

I usually describe the supraordinate personality as the ‘self’, thus making a sharp distinction between the ego, which, as is well known, extends only as far as the conscious mind, and the whole of the personality, which includes the unconscious as well as the conscious component. The ego is thus related to the self as part to whole. (Jung, 1941: 187, my emphasis)

In analytical psychology, we find ourselves in the embrace of ideas that give to the ego the task of biological survival but to the self the greater task of individuation. For instance, Jung draws our attention to the primordial cycle of day and night:
The sun, rising triumphant, tears himself from the enveloping womb of the sea, and leaving behind him the noonday zenith and all its glorious works, sinks down again into the maternal depths, into all-enfolding and all-regenerating night. (Jung, 1912: 355)

The ascent speaks of the first half of the human life cycle, of the individual’s maturation and differentiation. But the descent, far from signifying a state of decline, is seen as the path to individuation, which Jung regards as the great spiritual goal. He continues:

And having reached the noonday heights, [Man] must sacrifice his love for his own achievement, for he may not loiter. The sun, too, sacrifices its greatest strength in order to hasten onward to the fruits of autumn, which are the seeds of rebirth. (Jung, 1912: 356)

Jung later goes on to say:

Because of its unconscious component the self is so far removed from the conscious mind that it can only be partially expressed by human figures; the other part has to be expressed by objective, abstract symbols. (Jung, 1941: 187)

The archetypes which become manifest in human form include the animus and anima, the persona and the shadow. Of the abstract forms, the one we meet as group analysts each and every time we conduct a group is the mandala (Powell, 1989). This describes a circle, representing the microcosmos. Within is found a motif, usually based on the squaring of the circle, often in the form of a cross, or ‘quaternio’. The ‘quaternio’ itself signifies an image of wholeness, arising out of a conjunction of opposites, in the physical realm, for instance, the elements of air and earth, fire and water. Jung writes:

The mandala’s basic motif is the premonition of a centre of personality, a kind of central point within the psyche .... The energy of the central point is manifested in the almost irresistible compulsion to become what one is .... (Jung, 1950: 357, my emphasis)

Jung and the Matrix

The contents of the unconscious are indeed of the greatest importance, for the unconscious is after all the matrix of the human mind and its inventions. (Jung, 1946: 189)

How may we relate this process called individuation to the therapy group, what we might call the individuation of the group, in the group and by the group? This important question for group analysis has been posed by Romano Fiumara who argues that Foulkes’ definition of the matrix gives us a clue:

(it) enables us to outline, theoretically, a ‘surprising discovery’: what we are used to considering as intrapsychic . . . is in fact a property shared by the group. ... the intrapsychic is not distinguished from the interpersonal nor from the transpersonal since what belongs to the individual is shared by the group, and ‘society’ shows itself to be inside the individual just as it is outside of him or her. (Fiumara, 1983: 117)

The verb to individuate means to become indivisible, or whole. The mandala, which (unconsciously) comprises the very structure of the group is therefore a powerful invitation to undertake together the task of becoming more
who we are. This new frame of reference encourages us to refer not only to the ‘group mind’ of which Foulkes (1964) speaks but to the ‘group self’, an idea taken up by Louis Zinkin, who writes:

... the group-self, in turn, provides the group members with some notion of a larger transcendent self, ultimately a sense of ‘all there is’, or in Gnostic language ‘the All’ or the Pleroma, as being undivided, and that this is a religious experience. (Zinkin, 1989: 213)

A common misunderstanding is to equate this ‘religious’ experience with the notion of worship, readily leading to some kind of collective mystical illumination. On the contrary, the ‘higher union’ to which Jung refers is only to be discovered by the hard won integration of powerfully conflicting opposites (coniunctio oppositorum), such as joy and despair, love and hate or good and evil. Zinkin points out that this has deep philosophical implications:

It is in the field of morality that Jung’s Gnostic views have caused the greatest difficulty to theologians. Good and evil are opposites to be combined and are thus given equal status ... The Shadow has to be integrated rather than disowned ... we do see in the group, from time to time, moral issues becoming an important theme. Such discussions cannot always be treated as defensive avoidance .... (Zinkin, 1989: 213)

In his enquiry into alchemy, Jung showed that because the alchemist did not have recourse to any theory of psychology, archetypal primordia found their way into the chemistry of the mysterium coniunctionis which ‘takes place in the retort or, more indefinitely, in the “natural vessel” or matrix’ (Jung, 1955: 460). Furthermore, alchemists believed the coniunctio required the aid of the compound mercurius (quicksilver), ‘the soul of the gold and soul of the silver’, volatile in the fire and having the power to be transformed into ‘spirits’. Most important here was the attitude of mind of the alchemist, for this would directly affect the outcome of the coniunctio. A purity of intention and a moral disposition was essential.

We now know this sought-for conjunction is in essence psychological, not physical, which is why alchemy as a science did not succeed and why the philosopher's stone could not be produced. But we are as susceptible as the alchemist to the power of the same primordial images. Take, for example, Foulkes’ association of matrix with mother. This can be restated in the language of archetypes as having the archaic meaning of the Great Mother. Her two aspects, requiring to be integrated (the coniunctio) are her nurturing aspect and, equally, her terrifying, engulfing aspect (Prodgers, 1990). While this may be conceptualised psychoanalytically as the need to work through both the positive and negative transference, such a concept hardly does justice to the universality of inbuilt primordial images onto which, according to Jung, the experience of the actual breast is laid.

Jung’s learned exposition of the parallel between alchemy as metaphor and psychotherapy remains unsurpassed. The relevance to group analysis is striking. We have a vessel, the group matrix; our quicksilver is our knowledge of the unconscious life of the group; we form a mandala each time we put out the circle of chairs for a group and then we set about helping to integrate the many oppositions within.
One specific application has been described by Raul Usandivaras. He suggests that a group which is encouraged to be sensitive to, and to respond to, the primordial level, can be guided to explore the meaning of archetypes as they emerge, in dreams, and ritual ‘group myths’ created in the group, by the group:

Each member of the group makes his or her own journey to the underworld, to find his or her dissociated parts or ‘imprisoned soul’, as well as ‘the demons who keep it trapped’, and rescues them, integrating them to his or her self. Thus each one acts as a personal shaman sheltered by the protective climate of the group, with the guide of the therapist, the shaman of the totality. (Usandivaras, 1989: 165).

Usandivaras makes the point that this enterprise will only be fruitful (and safe) if the group has reached what he calls the stage of ‘communitas’, when it has attained a degree of useful regression allowing it to leave, in part, logical rational thought to give pre-eminence to “magic thought”, to intuition and to affects’ (Usandivaras, 1989: 163). This kind of regression in the group paradoxically requires a mature and trustworthy group; the task to be accomplished is one of introjection, not projection, a process that is very much the reverse of exorcism and called adorcism by the French anthropologist Pouillon (1972). In the group Usandivaras describes, it takes the form of a ‘psychodramatic’ reconstruction in which the whole group can share.

**The Matrix as a Psychophysical Structure**

Before I was enlightened the rivers were rivers and the mountains were mountains. When I began to be enlightened the rivers were not rivers any more and the mountains were not mountains. Now, since I am enlightened, the rivers are rivers again and the mountains are mountains. (statement by Zen Master, in Fromm et al., 1974: 118)

In this paper, I have suggested that there has been a significant discontinuity in the history of the matrix as it is conceived today The hiatus lies between the work of Freud and Foulkes as psychoanalyst on the one hand and Jung and Foulkes as group analyst on the other, in short between analysis and synthesis. While both lines of investigation have yielded treasure troves of psychological gems, each adorns reality rather than lays it bare. If, as I suspect, this reflects an insoluble epistemological problem, we might usefully turn our attention to a body of theory in which the relationship of part to whole informs not the eye of the beholder but that to which we are beholden for consciousness itself. I refer to the ‘new physics’, which has from the outset grappled with the problems of relativity (Albert Einstein) and wave/particle duality (quantum field theory) and in addressing the ‘totality’ may have much to tell us about the matrix as the very stuff of which we are made.

Let us make a temporary break with psychology and the metaphors that sustain it and look afresh at rivers, mountains, indeed the whole of physical reality into which we are so often busily projecting our minds. Most psychotherapists, the writer included, have not studied higher mathematics, physics or chemistry and are obliged to take on trust publications for the intelligent layman made available by scholars in the field such as Bohm (1980), Prigogine and Stengers (1984), Hawking (1988) and Lockwood (1989). Such increasingly popular works show a deep concern with the cultural whole, the very thing now implied by overlapping fields of experimental research. What
the philosopher Gilbert Ryle showed in 1949 to be logically a fallacy, the Cartesian divide between mind and matter (the myth of the ‘Ghost in the Machine’), has long since been substantiated in the domain of particle physics.

It is not coincidence that Ernest Rutherford’s model of the atom as a nuclear mass surrounded by orbiting electrons mirrored a Newtonian view of a heliocentric solar system with the planets held in orbit by the gravitational field of the sun. Not surprisingly, Freud’s theories were likewise atomistic, the structure of the psyche being revealed by means of splitting it into a number of parts. In 1905, the year in which Freud wrote ‘Three Essays on Sexuality’, Albert Einstein put forward his theory of special relativity, in which the notion of absolute time was abolished. In 1915, when Freud was publishing his key papers on metapsychology, Einstein proposed his theory of general relativity, showing among other things that space-time is curved on account of the distribution of mass and energy within it. In 1920, while Freud was completing the first draft of the paper on group psychology and the analysis of the ego, Werner Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger and Paul Dirac formulated a new theory called quantum mechanics, based on the uncertainty principle. From the ‘micro-universe’ of subatomic events on the one hand to the ‘macro-universe’ of unimaginable distances and cosmic timescales on the other, the world of physical sciences had been stood on its head. We now know, for instance, that:

1. There is no such ‘thing’ as an atom, as Newtonian physics had supposed. What comprises the nucleus consists of an ever-lengthening list of smaller particles (such as mesons, in turn composed of quarks, anti-quarks, and so on) many of which exist for only a short time (millionths of a second) and others (protons) which have endured unchanged throughout the time span of the Universe.

2. Matter, once thought to be particulate in structure, as in the case of the electron, is now known to exist both as particle and wave, depending on the experimental instrument, and which perforce includes the observer. Energy in waveform is without limit or boundary. The distinction between solid form and ‘space’ is no more than a product of our special sense organs, functioning at a given level of magnification and in a related time frame.

3. The Universe as we perceive it flows forward in time (the unidirectional ‘arrow of time’). But ‘the Universe’ is something of a misnomer, for we are most probably interpenetrated with other universes in which time flows in other directions, including backwards in relation to our time. ‘Black holes’ can be counted among the evidence.

4. Even within the ambit of our universe, events are not related in a linear fashion, but form a matrix in space and time in which everything is intimately connected to everything else (the ‘Holoverse’). Our notion of cause and effect, on which Newtonian physics is based, is probably no more than an eddy in a vast whirlpool.

5. The ‘Big Bang’ is one of many ‘singularities’ which demonstrate the very partial nature of our theories of reality, as also the ‘Big Crunch’ (for those who predict that the Universe will eventually cease expanding and, after a period of contraction, implode on itself.) The question: ‘Then who invented God?’ presupposes a linear continuity of space and time that simply is not there.
These few remarks remind us that we, as a life form, happen to occupy a niche in the cosmos at a certain intersection of space and time, rather remarkably informed by consciousness, and that what we take for reality is comprised of ‘local’ factors at this particular meeting point. Some people, astrophysicists for instance, are inclined to ponder the fact more than others. Psychotherapists, as humble astronomers of the mind, may too reflect that what goes on between therapist and patient or client, let alone between all mortal souls, can never be encompassed by the mere spoken word (Powell, 1990). We are all participants in a matrix, which is no less physical for being largely invisible. Even its invisibility is in question, for the aura that certain people claim to be able to see, and possibly Kirlian photography reveals, is very likely the direct visual perception of a vibrant electromagnetic field. Such radiation without doubt exists and extends some considerable distance. Far from being physically separate as therapist and patient might suppose, both are thoroughly immersed in each other’s electromagnetic fields. This proximity lends a new meaning to the term ‘projection’. Just as solid matter and space are confluent, so too are mind and body. Quantum mechanics shows that particle and wave combine as two sides of the same coin; mind and matter ineluctably coexist. The process of imaginative identification that we call empathy may even turn out to be a sensitivity not unlike clairvoyance! This astonishing fact, of physical and mental interpenetration, calls to mind Foulkes’ statement that:

. . . it is always the transpersonal network that is sensitised and gives utterance or responds. In this sense we can postulate the existence of a group mind.
(Foulkes, 1964: 118)

We now have good reason to assert the fact of the group mind, not only as metaphysical but physical. Further, we no longer have to maintain that the principle of mental functioning to which it must adhere is the Newtonian one of causal determinism; there is room for a new psychology which allows, for instance, for synchronicity and where, as Foulkes (1948: 69) reminded us long ago, ‘flexibility and spontaneity are the key notes’.

The ‘new physics’ makes plain that we exist in, and are part of, a matrix of awesome energy. The metapsychology of the future, especially when having in mind the ‘totality’, surely needs to advance on a psychophysical front. Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) makes curious reading today, but only because the right tools were not at his disposal. Had he the choice, I suspect a reincarnated Freud would be found heading a department of theoretical physics. For those of us group analysts getting on with the job in hand, we have the practical task, every bit as much as the nuclear physicist, of harnessing the forces of nature to the advantage of mankind. Unlike atomic scientists; we do not need nuclear reactors to do it.

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